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Requirement for Legal Certainty

In U.S. law, the principle of legal certainty is worded as a fair warning and the principle of nullity as vagueness. [11] 8 The choice of a systemic theory as the basis for my analysis is explained by the fact that the principle of legal certainty was of particular interest to theorists with a background in civil law. Google Scholar 55 For a critical account of the dialectic of legal interpretation, see note 44, 125 above. He essentially argues that the dialectical interpretation of law is characterized by conflict, power, and normativity. Google Scholar Read the last 496 press articles on legal certainty 30 See note 10 above, Dworkin, 239-240. It does not take into account what may be required for the compliance of another organisation (e.g. customer X or company Y) or what may be required for the company in relation to other aspects of data protection compliance (e.g. transparency, legal basis for processing, data minimisation, etc.). In this response, a number of common data protection terms are used, such as “personal data”, “processing”, “controller”, “joint controller” and “processor”. For a definition of these terms, see Practice Reference is made to legal securityty 8 in Halsbury`s Laws of England In European Union law, the general principle of legal certainty prohibits laws a posteriori, i.e.

laws should only enter into force before they are published. The general principle also requires that sufficient information be published so that the parties can know and comply with the law. For example, in the Opel Austria/Council case[6], the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the European Council Regulation does not enter into force until it has been published. Opel brought the action on the ground that the contested regulation infringed the principle of legal certainty, since it had entered into force before its notification and publication. [4] The doctrine of the protection of legitimate expectations, rooted in the principles of legal certainty and good faith, is also a central element of the general principle of legal certainty in EU law. [7] The concept can be pursued by English common law[1] by recognizing this system that legal certainty requires that laws be made in such a way that people can comply with them. 73 See footnote 59, 364 above. The CJEU also often refers only to the relevant sources of law, principles and legislation, without opening these arguments by explaining why they are relevant and what their content is. Google Scholar Legal Certainty is a legal concept established in both civil law and common law legal systems. In the civil law tradition, legal certainty is defined as the maximum predictability of the conduct of officials. In the common law tradition, legal certainty is often explained by the ability of citizens to conduct their affairs in a manner that does not break the law. In both legal traditions, legal certainty is considered to be the basis for the legality of legal and administrative measures taken by public authorities.

[2] 35 See note 10 above, Habermas, 222-223. Habermas attempts to develop Dworkin`s only correct answer beyond the monologue, centered on the judge, which seems to be central to Dworkin`s theory. In fact, Dworkin does not address the issue of the different legal paradigms that exist simultaneously in a particular community. See also footnote 10 above, Dworkin, 225.Google Scholar 5 This is also the reason why the extensive case-law of the CJEU on the principle of legal certainty is not examined in this article. Google Scholar legal certainty is a principle of national and international law that states that the law must give subjects the opportunity to regulate their behavior. The principle of legal certainty is one of the general principles of Union law1. It requires that the effects of a statutory provision be clear and predictable for those subject to it.2 It also requires that EU law allow data subjects to be informed of the precise scope of the obligations imposed on them3. It is therefore necessary that Union law be published in an appropriate and timely manner4. In particular, legal certainty requires 86 See footnote 4, 225-226 above. Tuori warns that there is a risk that concepts such as the rule of law and legal certainty will be “inflated” by anything perceived as positive. What happens then is that these concepts lose their status and instead become “rhetorical balloons”. See also notes 33 and 220 above.

It could be argued that such reasoning would also achieve a higher degree of predictability in legal decision-making, as transparency opens the interpretive process to criticism and genuine dialogue between legal actors in the EU legal community. Google Scholar 78 Id., 340. Appealing to emotions is usually associated with political argumentation, not legal argumentation. Google Scholar 22 See note 10 above, Habermas, 217. Habermas seems to suggest that courts in modern legal systems must engage in both justification and application discourses, since the political process alone does not sufficiently justify norms from a communicative point of view. Google Scholar 3 It should be noted that the notion of legal certainty is generally used in civil law systems. At common law, the principle of the rule of law would be the closest. See, for example, Peczenik (Note 1), 31.Google Scholar 77 Id., 362. Paso points out that comparative law arguments could be useful for the CJEU to convince the public of this dialogue. In this sense, it suggests that the use of a greater number of comparative law arguments could lead to a more nuanced dialogue and an open legal argumentation of the CJEU for a critical examination of different arguments and points of view.

See note 12 and 6 above. Maduro argues that the CJEU should not use comparative law as a means of abstractly identifying what he believes is the best legal solution. The bottom-up construction and legitimacy of EU law, in which the CJEU plays a key role, requires that the CJEU respects common national legal traditions and not simply uses comparative law to seek its preferred legal solution between different national legal systems. See also Jan Smits, Comparative Law and its Influence on National Legal Systems, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 513, 537 (Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). Google Scholar Accelerate all aspects of your legal work with tools that help you work faster and smarter.